Plotinus: rambling thoughts about philosophy
Problems with the little triangle trick at the beginning:
1) In statement #1, it is not necessarily the case that evil is excluded by perfect love and goodness.
2) In statement #3, it remains to be established by what means God intends to destroy evil.
3) In statement #4, there is no definition for the “power” in the word “powerful.”
4) Again, statement #6 is totally dependent upon knowing that God intends to destroy evil by force. Does revelation bear this out? Does John 3:16 attest to the truth of this position? Does any scripture? Does any symbolic picture point to this as God’s modus operandi? What does it mean that God is long suffering?
Plotinus posits a wall at the end of the universe, on the other side of which, there is nothing. That nothing, is evil and it has the negative “uncapacity” to draw one away from the goodness that is describable as the oneness or unity that exists in opposition to the dissemination that is nothing. However, the wall at the edge of the universe is not very high and it is possible for one to visit it (in imagination) and look over at the nothingness. When this happens, the wall must move to the outer reaches of vision and expands the range of goodness since something existing has entered it or, at least, noticed that the back side of the wall faces the nothingness. One problem with this idea is that one can imagine an infinite egress that should be as impossible as an infinite regress. Another problem with it is that the idea itself was formed in the mind of a man (or possibly a being greater than man) and the totality of the system represented proceeded forth from what was already in existence. Therefore, the nothingness has to have positive reality as its basis and cannot be fully unreal.
Plotinus, then, illustrates for us the flaw in the Platonic model of reality in that Plato’s system lacks a realistic understanding of the “barrier” between Ideal and Material. If the Ideal has any relationship to the Material at all (as seen above), then the Ideal must either permit change or it can be described as a perpetual motion machine and all that is real takes place in the Material realm where change is possible. If one wishes to posit that some message is periodically sent from the Ideal world to the Material and that it causes things to be rearranged according to the “will” of the occupants of the Ideal realm, then that person would be mistaken since the interjection of the “message” would merely be a part of the function of the perpetual motion machine and it would have no meaning. That is not to say that it would have no impact on the Material realm, but its impact would be based on its causal interaction rather than its purposive nature. In this model, there could be no definitive will of God but only an interpretive will, i.e., the occupants of the Material realm would define the will of God on the basis of the Material system. Nothing in the Ideal realm could be viewed as having any moral force, merely the force of unchanging power. Therefore, the only ideal in the universe would be power. So spoke Nietzsche.
The problem with Augustinian Idealism is that it suffers from the same weakness as described above. Where is the barrier between the Ideal and the Material? If Augustine denies the evil condition of the Material realm in words, he affirms his belief that it is evil by default. If God’s thoughts are all pure and good and it is incumbent upon us to think God’s thoughts, how is this possible on this side of the barrier? In order for one to exist without being subject to a “malfunction,” one must be in total and continuous communion with the mind of God. But how is this possible unless one is God? In other words, Augustine ignores the barrier and constructs a dualistic system that parallels Plato’s but includes a theodicy, a disclaimer that exempts God from responsibility for evil. Evil, to Augustine, becomes that force that filters messages from the Ideal realm and twists them. By locating evil in the will of man, he indicates that the perpetual motion machine in the Ideal realm is fully functional but that it is not hermetic and transmits some of its substance into the material world via a messenger. This messenger can be pictured as light that focuses itself onto the “screen” of the mind of man. Man’s evil will distorts or disrupts the light and the result is bad behavior or sin. If one is free from his evil will, then the messages will be free from distortion and the man can be restored to full function. (Notice that this idealism does not affirm the complete innocence of Adam or Eve and impugns God’s declaration that His work of creation is Good!) Thus, the best end of man is to suffer a spiritual lobotomy and destroy his will in order to achieve enlightenment. This condition may seem to be ideal but how, then, can man continue to function as a being created in God’s image without a will? Augustine sneaks the inherent evil of the Material realm in by the back door because he attaches the will of man to his animal nature, thus saving the rational nature from being inherently tainted unless one gives himself up completely to self-absorption. Again, a large difficulty with this position is in viewing evil as good that has malfunctioned since, 1) how can good cease to function properly and 2) how can Augustine ignore the fact that evil is evil because of intention rather than consequence. A misapplication of fire such as setting a backfire without calculating the effects of the wind is not evil even though the results may be unprecedented in their destructive character. The use of a magnifying glass by a small boy to burn his sister’s doll is an evil that, though insignificant in its results, cannot be ignored without placing the boy in spiritual jeopardy. Finally, where does Augustine obtain the scriptural precedent for his model of “enlightenment?” Is there any place that points toward the possibility of man having a fully illuminated mind (outside of gnostic doctrine)? And, if one achieves this status, what is the function of faith?
Hindu Pessimism extends the Idealistic picture along Manichaean lines. The Ideal world exists as a perpetual motion machine but there are conduits of enlightenment that extend to every being. Virtually all of these conduits allow flow from the Ideal world into a being and the result is similar to light attaching itself to a flame or filament that is excited by electricity. The light is Ideal substance and lends itself to the Material but is not impacted by the condition of the Material. So there is no suffering in the Ideal realm and the portion of the Ideal that is “resident” in the Material world cannot experience suffering even though the being to which it is attached may be in agony. This condition is reasonable since the Ideal is in perpetual motion and has no consciousness or moral understanding and cannot be implicated in such conditions of the Material realm. The adjustment that Hindus make on the Platonic Model is that they allow, under certain circumstances, for movement in both directions in the conduit. When a being has reached a state of liberation from the material by 1)devotion to a deity, 2)works: following an ancient ritual, 3)knowledge: achieving true doctrine, then that being will move through the conduit into the Ideal realm and be absorbed. All of which is a far cry from the original Hebrew doctrine of a calling to serve that perfectly reflects the creator God.
Nihilism totally accepts the perpetual motion machine but establishes that it is all that there is and there is no meaning coming from it, no messages generated by it, no causal relationships on account of it; it is and existence is its own justification. The cardinal difficulty with this position is that lack of meaning (or reasoning, or rationality, or mind, etc.) is universal and the proponents of this doctrine deny their own position by acknowledging the validity of reasoning in any sense. For example, the use of reasoning to arrive at the conclusion that nihilism is valid cannot be true for either their conclusion is invalidated by the ground of their argument or by its consequent.
Theistic finitism is, essentially, not worth discussing since we have no concept as to whether God is finite or not. If he is, then our finite concept of finitude still cannot explain God’s mode of existence. In addition, we don’t know what God knows nor how he knows it. Neither do we know what power is nor to what degree God uses it; whether it is more truly described as his authority or the perfect force of his love. We cannot even, when contemplating Jesus, the God/Man, understand how it is possible for him, who set aside his heavenly glory, to lay down his life and take it back up again. That he did so is true and we cling to this fact in faith and hope but we understand none of it since it is beyond our frame of reference. A guitar may play the melody line of an orchestral piece but it cannot be constrained to sound like a tuba and a piccolo and a bass drum simultaneously.
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Plotinus: rambling thoughts on absoluteness
Plotinus: rambling thoughts about philosophy
Problems with the little triangle trick at the beginning:
1) In statement #1, it is not necessarily the case that evil is excluded by perfect love and goodness.
2) In statement #3, it remains to be established by what means God intends to destroy evil.
3) In statement #4, there is no definition for the “power” in the word “powerful.”
4) Again, statement #6 is totally dependent upon knowing that God intends to destroy evil by force. Does revelation bear this out? Does John 3:16 attest to the truth of this position? Does any scripture? Does any symbolic picture point to this as God’s modus operandi? What does it mean that God is long suffering?
Plotinus posits a wall at the end of the universe, on the other side of which, there is nothing. That nothing, is evil and it has the negative “uncapacity” to draw one away from the goodness that is describable as the oneness or unity that exists in opposition to the dissemination that is nothing. However, the wall at the edge of the universe is not very high and it is possible for one to visit it (in imagination) and look over at the nothingness. When this happens, the wall must move to the outer reaches of vision and expands the range of goodness since something existing has entered it or, at least, noticed that the back side of the wall faces the nothingness. One problem with this idea is that one can imagine an infinite egress that should be as impossible as an infinite regress. Another problem with it is that the idea itself was formed in the mind of a man (or possibly a being greater than man) and the totality of the system represented proceeded forth from what was already in existence. Therefore, the nothingness has to have positive reality as its basis and cannot be fully unreal.
Plotinus, then, illustrates for us the flaw in the Platonic model of reality in that Plato’s system lacks a realistic understanding of the “barrier” between Ideal and Material. If the Ideal has any relationship to the Material at all (as seen above), then the Ideal must either permit change or it can be described as a perpetual motion machine and all that is real takes place in the Material realm where change is possible. If one wishes to posit that some message is periodically sent from the Ideal world to the Material and that it causes things to be rearranged according to the “will” of the occupants of the Ideal realm, then that person would be mistaken since the interjection of the “message” would merely be a part of the function of the perpetual motion machine and it would have no meaning. That is not to say that it would have no impact on the Material realm, but its impact would be based on its causal interaction rather than its purposive nature. In this model, there could be no definitive will of God but only an interpretive will, i.e., the occupants of the Material realm would define the will of God on the basis of the Material system. Nothing in the Ideal realm could be viewed as having any moral force, merely the force of unchanging power. Therefore, the only ideal in the universe would be power. So spoke Nietzsche.
The problem with Augustinian Idealism is that it suffers from the same weakness as described above. Where is the barrier between the Ideal and the Material? If Augustine denies the evil condition of the Material realm in words, he affirms his belief that it is evil by default. If God’s thoughts are all pure and good and it is incumbent upon us to think God’s thoughts, how is this possible on this side of the barrier? In order for one to exist without being subject to a “malfunction,” one must be in total and continuous communion with the mind of God. But how is this possible unless one is God? In other words, Augustine ignores the barrier and constructs a dualistic system that parallels Plato’s but includes a theodicy, a disclaimer that exempts God from responsibility for evil. Evil, to Augustine, becomes that force that filters messages from the Ideal realm and twists them. By locating evil in the will of man, he indicates that the perpetual motion machine in the Ideal realm is fully functional but that it is not hermetic and transmits some of its substance into the material world via a messenger. This messenger can be pictured as light that focuses itself onto the “screen” of the mind of man. Man’s evil will distorts or disrupts the light and the result is bad behavior or sin. If one is free from his evil will, then the messages will be free from distortion and the man can be restored to full function. (Notice that this idealism does not affirm the complete innocence of Adam or Eve and impugns God’s declaration that His work of creation is Good!) Thus, the best end of man is to suffer a spiritual lobotomy and destroy his will in order to achieve enlightenment. This condition may seem to be ideal but how, then, can man continue to function as a being created in God’s image without a will? Augustine sneaks the inherent evil of the Material realm in by the back door because he attaches the will of man to his animal nature, thus saving the rational nature from being inherently tainted unless one gives himself up completely to self-absorption. Again, a large difficulty with this position is in viewing evil as good that has malfunctioned since, 1) how can good cease to function properly and 2) how can Augustine ignore the fact that evil is evil because of intention rather than consequence. A misapplication of fire such as setting a backfire without calculating the effects of the wind is not evil even though the results may be unprecedented in their destructive character. The use of a magnifying glass by a small boy to burn his sister’s doll is an evil that, though insignificant in its results, cannot be ignored without placing the boy in spiritual jeopardy. Finally, where does Augustine obtain the scriptural precedent for his model of “enlightenment?” Is there any place that points toward the possibility of man having a fully illuminated mind (outside of gnostic doctrine)? And, if one achieves this status, what is the function of faith?
Hindu Pessimism extends the Idealistic picture along Manichaean lines. The Ideal world exists as a perpetual motion machine but there are conduits of enlightenment that extend to every being. Virtually all of these conduits allow flow from the Ideal world into a being and the result is similar to light attaching itself to a flame or filament that is excited by electricity. The light is Ideal substance and lends itself to the Material but is not impacted by the condition of the Material. So there is no suffering in the Ideal realm and the portion of the Ideal that is “resident” in the Material world cannot experience suffering even though the being to which it is attached may be in agony. This condition is reasonable since the Ideal is in perpetual motion and has no consciousness or moral understanding and cannot be implicated in such conditions of the Material realm. The adjustment that Hindus make on the Platonic Model is that they allow, under certain circumstances, for movement in both directions in the conduit. When a being has reached a state of liberation from the material by 1)devotion to a deity, 2)works: following an ancient ritual, 3)knowledge: achieving true doctrine, then that being will move through the conduit into the Ideal realm and be absorbed. All of which is a far cry from the original Hebrew doctrine of a calling to serve that perfectly reflects the creator God.
Nihilism totally accepts the perpetual motion machine but establishes that it is all that there is and there is no meaning coming from it, no messages generated by it, no causal relationships on account of it; it is and existence is its own justification. The cardinal difficulty with this position is that lack of meaning (or reasoning, or rationality, or mind, etc.) is universal and the proponents of this doctrine deny their own position by acknowledging the validity of reasoning in any sense. For example, the use of reasoning to arrive at the conclusion that nihilism is valid cannot be true for either their conclusion is invalidated by the ground of their argument or by its consequent.
Theistic finitism is, essentially, not worth discussing since we have no concept as to whether God is finite or not. If he is, then our finite concept of finitude still cannot explain God’s mode of existence. In addition, we don’t know what God knows nor how he knows it. Neither do we know what power is nor to what degree God uses it; whether it is more truly described as his authority or the perfect force of his love. We cannot even, when contemplating Jesus, the God/Man, understand how it is possible for him, who set aside his heavenly glory, to lay down his life and take it back up again. That he did so is true and we cling to this fact in faith and hope but we understand none of it since it is beyond our frame of reference. A guitar may play the melody line of an orchestral piece but it cannot be constrained to sound like a tuba and a piccolo and a bass drum simultaneously.
Like this:
This entry was posted on September 12, 2010 at 23:39 and is filed under Commentary. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.